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I. Introduction
The world’s oceans are in bad shape. According to a 2008 article by
Jeremy Jackson, a marine ecologist at the Scripps Institution of
Oceanography, we are well on our way to the next oceanic mass extinction.1
We have no idea what the ultimate outcome will be, though we do know that
it doesn’t look good for most plants and animals.2 Jellyfish and bacteria,
“the rats and roaches of the sea,” are likely to fare well - already, severely
degraded ecosystems like the Black and Caspian seas contain little else.3
Even people with little affinity for the marine world should be
concerned about this crash in oceanic biodiversity. Oceanic and coastal
ecosystems provide food for millions of people across the globe, as well as
invaluable “ecosystem services” such as waste detoxification and flood
control.4 A recent meta-analysis of existing data by Boris Worm, Jeremy
Jackson, and twelve other researchers showed that biodiversity strongly
enhances marine ecosystems’ food productivity, resource use efficiency, and
resilience in the face of recurrent disturbances.5 A mass extinction would
not just be bad news for snorkelers and seafood lovers, but for all marine
ecosystems and the people who depend on them.
The causes of this impending catastrophe include overfishing, habitat
destruction, pollution, and global climate change, as well as the complex
interactions among these factors. Humans have been overexploiting coastal

1.
Jeremy B.C. Jackson, Ecological Extinction and Evolution in the Brave New Ocean,
105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11458, 11458 (2008).
2.
Id.
3.
Randy Olson, “Shifting Baselines: Slow-Motion Disaster in the Sea,”
ACTION BIOSCIENCE, Dec. 2002 (available at http://www.actionbioscience.org/
environment/olson.html).
4.
Boris Worm, Edward B. Barbier, et al., Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean
Ecosystem Services, SCIENCE, Nov. 3, 2006, at 787.
5.
Id.
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fisheries for centuries, but technological developments in the last fifty years
now let fishermen land their yearly allowable catch in days, or even hours.
Oceanic habitat is destroyed by enormous trawling ships, which drag huge
weighted nets across the continental shelf, sometimes covering an entire
fishery in less than a year. Pollution comes in the form of toxic chemicals
and nutrient runoff, washing down rivers and through drainage systems and
forming dead zones and algal blooms. Climate change is warming the
oceans and causing acidification of seawater, a trend that is likely to lead to
mass mortality for corals and calcareous plankton.
International law aimed at protecting the natural environment has
blossomed in the last several decades, but the decline of the oceans must
lead us to ask if existing laws and policies are adequate to the task. In
Section II of this essay, I will address the question of whether international
treaties and conventions dealing with biodiversity are sufficient to protect
marine ecosystems. In Sections III through VI, I will briefly describe some of
the international laws that deal with each threat that Jackson describes overfishing, habitat destruction, pollution, and climate change - and
investigate how effective these laws have been so far. Finally, in Section VII,
I will explore the role and effectiveness of domestic law in the waters of
Alaska, home of the largest whitefish fishery in the world.

II. Protecting Marine Biodiversity
It might seem that the most sensible and direct way to protect
endangered oceanic biodiversity would be with laws explicitly designed for
that purpose. There are, in fact, several international agreements in place to
protect biodiversity, from the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (“CITES”), which boasts 175 Parties,6 to the Convention
on Biological Diversity (“CBD”), a United Nations-sponsored framework with
193 Parties - almost every country, with the notable exception of the United
States.7
However, direct protection of the oceans’ biodiversity can be a tricky
matter. One problem is that, of the three general types of biodiversity genetic diversity within a species, species diversity within an ecosystem, and
ecosystem diversity (the range of different ecosystems existing on Earth)8 laws like CITES (and the Endangered Species Act, the U.S. version of CITES)
tend to focus exclusively on species diversity, thus missing both the bigger
and the smaller picture. Another problem is that while scientists know of

6.
See “What is CITES?”, available at www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.shtml.
7.
See Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), “List of Parties,” available at
www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list.
8.
See, e.g., Donald K. Anton, Law for the Sea’s Biological Diversity, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 341, 344-45 (1997).
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approximately 300,000 oceanic species, unknown species may number in the
millions.9 For a species to gain protection under laws like the Endangered
Species Act or CITES, it must first be “listed” as endangered or threatened.10
Needless to say, this is an impossible feat for a species that has not even
been identified, let alone studied.
Perhaps the greatest problem of all for marine biodiversity is that
while human beings seem to be primarily motivated by economic selfinterest, it is all but impossible to calculate the value (economic, intrinsic,
or otherwise) of biodiversity, especially in the oceans, where it remains
invisible to us.11 Regardless of such hurdles, it is worth beginning our survey
with laws directed at biodiversity, if only to demonstrate why they are
insufficient to protect marine species.

A. Convention on Biological Diversity
In Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the United Nations held its Conference on
Environment and Development, popularly known as the Earth Summit.12
The conference featured the unveiling and signing of a pair of new
environmental conventions: the Climate Change Convention and the CBD.
Though the Governing Council of the UN Environment Programme originally
intended the CBD to be an “umbrella convention,” consolidating and
coordinating existing biodiversity law and filling in any gaps, this turned out
to be politically impossible. The existing CBD is a “framework” treaty, with
“primarily aspirational provisions” still waiting for a future Conference of the
Parties to give them substance and force.13
Even as an aspirational text, the CBD is far too deferential to national
sovereignty to have any real meaning. Its central principle, as stated in
Article 3, is that “States have . . . the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies,” so long as their
actions do not cause harm beyond their own boundaries.14
This
counterproductive principle was seen as a necessary concession to the
demands of the developing countries, which contain most of the world’s
biodiversity and have been resistant to any limitations on their ability to

9.
John Charles Kunich, Losing Nemo: The Mass Extinction Now Threatening the
World’s Ocean Hotspots, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 13-14 (2005).
10.
Kalyani Robbins, Strength in Numbers: Setting Quantitative Criteria for Listing
Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2009).
11.
Anton, supra note 8, at 346-47.
12.
LAKSHMAN GURUSWAMY, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 39
(2nd ed. 2003).
13.
Id. at 133-34.
14.
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (hereinafter “CBD”),
art. 3, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 1993 A.T.S. 32 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993).
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develop.15 However, in pandering to squeamish developing countries, the
parties wound up with a treaty that “leaves adherence and implementation
entirely up to the discretion of the signatories and provides no
consequences for inaction” - in essence, a toothless treaty.16
As for specifically marine biodiversity, the CBD says only that
Convention provisions must be implemented “consistently with the rights
and obligations of States under the law of the sea.”17 Though not mentioned
by name, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is
generally held to embody the existing law of the sea;18 it will be discussed in
several sections below. In 1995, the Second Conference of the Parties to the
CBD explicitly addressed marine and coastal biological diversity in the
Jakarta Mandate (“Mandate”).19 According to Professor Chris Wold, the
Jakarta Mandate represented “relatively strong efforts” by the parties, but
marine issues were barely mentioned at the Third Conference of the Parties,
and little had been accomplished several years later.20 Still, Wold sees
tremendous potential in the Mandate, especially in its advocacy of the
precautionary principle and whole-ecosystem conservation.21

B. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Thirty years in the making, the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) finally emerged in 1982 and took an additional twelve
years to enter into force.22 Because of the Convention’s broad sweep, it has
been called “a ‘constitution’ for the oceans”23 and “[t]he overarching
instrument of the oceans law pantheon.”24 Probably the most noteworthy
result of UNCLOS is its resolution of the age-old debate over ocean
jurisdiction. Under UNCLOS, coastal states’ sovereignty extends for an area

15.
GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 135.
16.
Tamara Mullen, The Convention on Biological Diversity and High-Seas Bottom
Trawling: The Means to an End, 14 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 135, 145 (2007).
17.
CBD, supra note 14, at art. 22.
18.
A. Charlotte De Fontaubert, David R. Downes, & Tundi S. Agardy,
Biodiversity in the Seas: Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity in Marine and Coastal
Habitats, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 753, 758 (1998).
19.
Robin Kundis Craig, Protecting International Marine Biodiversity: International
Treaties and National Systems of Marine Protected Areas, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 333,
364 (2005).
20.
Chris Wold, The Futility, Utility, and Future Of The Biodiversity Convention, 9
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (1998).
21.
Id. at 27.
22.
GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 391.
23.
Id. at 392.
24.
ROBIN WARNER, PROTECTING THE OCEANS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 27
(David Freestone ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009).
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of 12 nautical miles from shore, a region called “the territorial sea.”25 Each
coastal state also has jurisdiction over the area from its coast to 200
nautical miles out to sea, called the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”).26
The expansion of state control over the area of the EEZ can be seen as
a conservation incentive, in that states are more likely to create and enforce
laws to protect resources that they “own.” The CBD, for example, attempts
to incentivize biodiversity protection by giving states intellectual property
and other ownership rights to the biological resources within their
jurisdictions.27 But for the oceans beyond national jurisdiction, commonly
known as the high seas, the overarching governing principle of UNCLOS is
“freedom of use and equal access by all states.”28 This freedom is not
limitless, and several provisions of UNCLOS and its associated agreements
attempt to place controls on, for example, overfishing (discussed in Section
III below). Even these, however, have failed to prevent the collapse of
several international fisheries.29 If UNCLOS cannot adequately protect an
international resource as lucrative as a fishery, it is unlikely to offer any real
protection to less economically valuable species or ecosystems.
The United States, in its embarrassing neglect of international law, has
thus far declined to become a party to either the CBD or UNCLOS,30 though
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in her 2009 confirmation hearing
that ratification of UNCLOS was “long overdue” and would be a priority for
her.31 As of mid-2010, UNCLOS was still awaiting attention from the U.S.
Senate, despite broad-based support from industry, environmentalists, and
the military.32

C. Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
Another international treaty that (at least theoretically) protects

25.
De Fontaubert et al., supra note 18.
26.
Id.
27.
Anton, supra note 8, at 356.
28.
Id. at 360.
29.
Id. at 363.
30.
See CBD, supra note 14; Oceans and Law of the Sea, Chronological lists of
ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related
Agreements as at 06 November 2009, available at www.virginia.edu/colp/los.html
(follow “Current List of Parties to the Convention and the Related Agreements (UN)”
hyperlink).
31.
Council on Foreign Relations, Transcript of Hillary Clinton’s Confirmation
Hearing, available at www.cfr.org/publication/18225/transcript_of_hillary_clintons_
confirmation_hearing.html.
32.
John B. Bellinger III, Without White House Muscle, Treaties Left in Limbo, WASH.
POST, June 11, 2010.
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marine species is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, commonly known as CITES, which has
been called “the flagship international agreement protecting wildlife.”33 The
basic aim of CITES is to protect plant and animal diversity by controlling
trade in endangered species. However, since CITES came into force in 1975,
global trade of endangered species has grown from an estimated $50 million
to $100 million per year to an estimated $15 billion to $25 billion per year.34
Two major issues help to explain why CITES has been so ineffective.
First, the convention divides listed species into three Appendices, with the
vast majority of species listed in Appendix II.35 Trade is allowed for
Appendix II species as long as the exporting country makes an official
finding that such trade poses no threat to species survival.36 With many
states lacking the capacity, data, or “political will” to make a proper nondetriment finding, this system allows trade in endangered species to
continue despite inadequate knowledge of many of its impacts.37 The other
major problem with CITES is that economic factors are allowed to play a role
in the decision on whether or not to list a species in the first place. In 2007,
for example, a U.S. proposal to list all red and pink corals was successfully
challenged by a group of politically powerful Italian artisans, who use the
corals to make valuable jewelry.38 Not only do economic considerations
undermine the very purpose of CITES (because effective trade restrictions
will always harm someone’s economic interests), they also suggest an ugly
willingness to prioritize the livelihoods of the rich and powerful.

III. Overfishing
In a controversial 2001 paper in Science, Jeremy Jackson and eighteen
co-authors laid out the hypothesis that “humans have been disturbing
marine ecosystems since they first learned how to fish.”39 The picture they
painted was so dire as to lead to charges that they “had somehow focused

33.
James B. Murphy, Alternative Approaches to the CITES ‘Non-Detriment’ Finding for
Appendix II Species, 36 ENVTL. L. 531, 532 (2006).
34.
Jonathan Liljeblad, Finding Another Link in the Chain: International Treaties and
Devolution to Local Law Enforcement in the Case of the Convention on the International Trade in
Endangered Species, 18 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 527, 527-29 (2009).
35.
See “The CITES Species,” available at www.cites.org/eng/disc/species.shtml
(showing, as of July 2, 2010, a total of 33,033 Appendix II species, as compared with
892 for Appendix I and 161 for Appendix III).
36.
Murphy, supra note 33, at 532-33.
37.
Id. at 533.
38.
Marjorie Mulhall, Saving the Rainforests of the Sea: An Analysis of International
Efforts to Conserve Coral Reefs, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 321, 344 (2009).
39.
Jeremy B. C. Jackson, Michael X. Kirby, et al., Historical Overfishing and the
Recent Collapse of Coastal Ecosystems, SCIENCE, Jul. 27, 2001, at 629.
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on only the worst-case scenarios,” an idea that Jackson took pains to
disprove in his 2008 article.40 In fact, says Jackson, among the approximately
eighty species his group studied, the majority of the mammal, bird, and
reptile species were already “severely depleted” by 1900.41 Today, of the
eighty species surveyed, 91% were found to be depleted, 31% rare, and 7%
extinct.42 Moreover, heavy fishing of large, predatory species can have
effects all the way down the food chain, in what is known as a “trophic
cascade.” Jackson cites the depletion of northwest Atlantic sharks, which led
to an explosion of cownose rays, which in turn decimated coastal mollusk
fisheries; similarly, the near-extinction of northeast Pacific sea otters led in
turn to an overgrowth of sea urchins, which proceeded to consume “entire
kelp forests.”43 The meta-analysis performed by Worm and Jackson et al.
predicts “the global collapse of all taxa currently fished by the mid-21st
century,” assuming the continuation of current trends.44
Already, poorly managed fisheries and declining fish populations are
costing the global fishing industry an estimated $50 billion per year.45 The
global spread of modern fishing technology has given human beings an
unprecedented capacity to decimate marine ecosystems, yet many people
seem to hold fast to the archaic notion that the oceans contain an
inexhaustible supply of fish.46

A. UNCLOS and the Exclusive Economic Zone
Within the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), UNCLOS grants a
number of rights to coastal States (e.g., exploiting natural resources,
building artificial structures, and conducting scientific research), but it also
imposes important responsibilities. Article 61, Section 1, mandates that
each coastal State set the allowable catch for fished species within its EEZ,
while Section 2 requires each coastal State to use “the best scientific
evidence available to it” to ensure that the marine life in its EEZ “is not
endangered by over-exploitation.”47 Unfortunately, these requirements are
somewhat undermined in Section 3, which states that conservation
measures “shall also be designed to maintain or restore populations of

40.
Jackson, supra note 1, at 11459.
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. at 11460.
44.
Worm, supra note 4.
45.
Eric A. Bilsky, Symposium: Territory Without Boundaries: Colonizing Natural
Resources: Conserving Marine Wildlife Through World Trade Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 599, 601
(2009).
46.
Id. at 601-03.
47.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), art. 61, Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
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harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable
yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors,
including the economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the
special requirements of developing States.”48 It is worth examining this
provision more closely.
First of all, given the choice between “maintaining” and “restoring” fish
stocks, most countries will choose the former, thereby guaranteeing that any
reduction in fish populations will become permanent. In fact, people often
do not even realize that a fish stock has been depleted. Standards shift
gradually downward as “each new generation takes as its baseline for
comparison the abundance of marine wildlife its members experience when
they first observe the sea.”49 This phenomenon is known as “shifting
baselines.” The term was first used in 1995 by Daniel Pauly, a Canadian
fisheries biologist, but it has been adopted to describe all types of slow,
difficult-to-notice environmental degradation.50 In the under-explored and
little-monitored world of the oceans, however, the problem is especially
acute, which is probably why the oceans awareness project co-created by
Jeremy Jackson can be found at “shiftingbaselines.org.”
The second problem with UNCLOS Article 61 is its stated goal of
producing the “maximum sustainable yield” of harvested species. The
maximum sustainable yield (“MSY”) concept was developed in the 1950s,
and even then many scientists believed it was not an appropriate goal for
fisheries management.51 The model is based on the idea that, if a species is
harvested, the remaining individuals will have more food and will thus grow
and reproduce more. The larger the catch, the more “productive” the
remaining stock, meaning that allowable catches should be set at the
highest point that will allow full replenishment by the next year.
Unfortunately, many fish stocks will actually crash when reduced to a low
density.52 Also, the eggs of younger fish may be weaker and less viable,
meaning that heavier catches of larger individuals may result in a “year class
failure.”53
Even where the MSY model works (in theory) for a single fish species,
the “sustainability” in question does not consider the effects of the fish
catch on marine habitat, accidentally caught species (bycatch), or the local

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Bilsky, supra note 45, at 602.
Olson, supra note 3.
CHARLES CLOVER, THE END OF THE LINE: HOW OVERFISHING IS CHANGING THE
WORLD AND WHAT WE EAT, 104-06 (2006).
52.
P.A. Larkin, Fisheries Management - An Essay for Ecologists, 9 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY
& SYSTEMATICS 57, 64-5 (1978).
53.
Id.
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oceanic food chain.54 Also, translating the MSY model to practice requires
extensive data (with no gaps or cheating) and an otherwise unchanging
environment, leaving it vulnerable (like many theoretical models) to the
unpredictability of the real world. This was well illustrated by the dramatic
collapse of the Peruvian anchoveta fishery in the early 1970s, when the
warmer waters of El Niño lowered fish numbers, which were then nearly
wiped out under the MSY-inspired allowable catch of 10 million tons/year.55
Peru’s problem was not just a matter of time or money - in the
comparatively wealthy U.S., as recently as 2007, fishery managers had
sufficient data for only 36% of exploited fish stocks.56
A third problem with the UNCLOS conservation directive is that it
strives for MSY “as qualified by relevant environmental and economic
factors.” This qualifier is reminiscent of the “where possible” inserted into a
similar fisheries directive at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable
Development, the follow-up to 1992’s Earth Summit. Journalist Charles
Clover was present at the 2002 Johannesburg summit, and remembers
thinking that “the assembled diplomats of the world” were extremely
pleased that they need only maintain or restore fish stocks “where possible,”
meaning that “they now didn’t have to do anything at all.”57
Finally, Article 61 states that the factors influencing MSY should
include “the economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the special
requirements of developing States.” The latter is a polite way of saying that
a state may plead poverty in order to avoid taking any conservation
measures. The former allows states to undermine their own conservation
efforts when under political pressure from the fishing industry. Fishing
enterprises already have a strong incentive to build up their catch capacity
in order to compete with each other for the largest share of the total
allowable catch.58 These overgrown fishing fleets then pressure their
governments for subsidies, higher catch quotas, and purchased fishing
rights in foreign waters when there is not enough fish to catch at home.
Globally, subsidies to the fishing industry total somewhere between
$20 billion and $50 billion per year, while the global fleet “is estimated to be
two and a half times greater than needed to catch what the ocean can
sustainably produce.”59 In Canada, conservation measures are “set up to
fail - necessarily,” according to Canadian fisheries biologist Ransom Myers,
because unemployment insurance allows fishermen to maintain oversized

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
200

Bilsky, supra note 45, at 606.
Colin W. Clark, Bioeconomics of the Ocean, 31 BIOSCIENCE 231, 232-3 (1981).
Bilsky, supra note 45, at 607.
CLOVER, supra note 51, at 106.
Bilsky, supra note 45, at 609.
Id. at 137-9.
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fishing fleets, creating constant pressure to raise allowable catches.60 Given
the obvious need for developed countries to stand up to their overgrown
fishing industries and shift employment elsewhere, one wonders why a
global convention would urge states to consider the economic needs of
coastal fishing communities when developing fish conservation strategies.
Perhaps it is time for coastal fishing communities to consider the economic
and environmental needs of their own states.

B. UNCLOS and the High Seas
UNCLOS attempts to tackle overfishing on the high seas (areas of the
ocean outside of any country’s EEZ) in Articles 117-19. Articles 117 and 118
require states to adopt conservation measures for their citizens and to
cooperate with other states in the conservation of living resources, but do
not list any specifics (aside from suggesting that states establish regional
fisheries bodies). Article 119, the heart of the matter, says that conservation
measures (including determination of the allowable catch) should be
designed “to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels
which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant
environmental and economic factors.”61 This should sound familiar by now.
Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS address the problem of fish stocks
covering an area beyond a single state’s EEZ. Though no new principles or
goals are listed, the two articles instruct States who fish for such stocks to
cooperate on conservation measures, either bilaterally or through regional
fisheries organizations.62 UNCLOS Annex I provides a list of “highly
migratory species” that require this cooperation, including eight species of
tuna plus entire taxonomic families of cetaceans (whales, dolphins, and
porpoises) and oceanic sharks.63 This issue was taken up in much more
detail in the 1995 U.N. Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, which will be discussed below.
The original UNCLOS provisions covering straddling stocks64 and
highly migratory fish stocks provided a basis for cooperation, but it soon
became evident that simply establishing regional fisheries was not
sufficient. For one thing, the regional bodies had no power to control
fishing by nonmembers. Thus, when the Northwest Atlantic Fishing
Organization (“NAFO”) reduced its total allowable catch for the period of

60.
CLOVER, supra note 51, at 133-4.
61.
UNCLOS, supra note 47, at art. 117-19.
62.
Id. at art. 63-4.
63.
Id. at ann. I.
64.
“Straddling stocks” are defined as “stocks occurring within the exclusive
economic zones of two or more coastal States or both within the exclusive economic
zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to it.” Id. at art. 63.
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1986-92, nationals of nonmember states increased their catch in the same
area by 27.7%.65
Another problem with regional fisheries was lack of enforcement. This
was illustrated by the “turbot war” between Canada and Spain in the mid1990s, precipitated by what became known as “the Estai incident.” The Estai
was a Spanish trawler that was fishing for turbot outside of Canada’s EEZ for
five months in 1994-95.66 A Canadian gunboat approached the trawler on
March 9, 1995, whereupon the Estai’s crew cut the nets loose and tried to
flee. The Canadians caught, boarded, and seized the trawler, setting off a
wave of international recrimination, including accusations of piracy.67 The
Canadian Minister of Fisheries, Brian Tobin, protested, “We’re down now
finally to one last, lonely, unloved, unattractive little turbot clinging on by
its fingernails to the Grand Banks of Newfoundland.”68 Canada, incidentally,
had set limits on turbot fishing in order to protect its last viable fishery, after
watching its once-tremendous cod stock dwindle down to almost nothing by
the early 1990s.69
With regards to Canada’s unilateral, extrajurisdictional enforcement
action against the Estai, the applicable international law is rather muddy at
best. Spain quickly filed a complaint against Canada with the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”), alleging violations of its vessel’s right to navigate and
fish in international waters.70 Canada asserted that the ICJ lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case because of a Canadian reservation specifically
excluding from ICJ jurisdiction “disputes arising out of or concerning
conservation and management measures taken by Canada with respect to
vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area . . . and the enforcement of such
measures.”71 In 1998, the ICJ agreed with Canada that it lacked jurisdiction
to hear the dispute.72 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Federal Court of Canada
found in 2005 that the seizure of the Estai was not illegal, though Canada
was ordered to pay $137,000 to the ship’s owners for lost income and
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expenses.73

C. 1995 U.N. Agreement on Straddling and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks
By the time of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, it was obvious that
stronger measures were necessary to protect migratory fish stocks, and a
United Nations conference was planned to address the topic.74 The
subsequent international uproar over the Estai incident only served to
illustrate a chronic problem with the UNCLOS system of “freedom of fishing”
on the high seas: while coastal States had an economic incentive to manage
and conserve the fish stocks within their jurisdiction, “distant water fishing
States” could (and did) simply come over and concentrate their efforts in the
area just beyond the coastal state’s 200-mile limit.75 Many of the fish
species that habitually migrated across these arbitrary boundaries were
becoming overexploited, and as Canada had demonstrated, coastal states
were becoming desperate for ways to enforce their conservation efforts
beyond the EEZ.
On August 4, 1995, the UN conference planned at the Earth Summit
bore fruit of real substance (if less-than-delightful nomenclature): the
United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (“SFSA” for short), which entered into force in
2001.76 Like UNCLOS, the SFSA uses regional fishery organizations as the
primary vehicle for conservation of straddling and migratory fish stocks.
However, the SFSA “compels greater cooperation between coastal states and
distant-water flag states” by requiring all flag states to join the regional
fisheries that govern the areas they fish, or at least to follow the rules set by
these fisheries.77
The Agreement also establishes an enforcement
procedure, in which officials from a regional fishery can “board and inspect”
any ship within the fishery’s area in order to ensure compliance with local
rules.78 If there is an alleged violation, the “inspecting state” notifies the
ship’s flag state, which must respond within three days.79
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Charles Clover’s description of this process in action makes for some
depressing reading. Clover requested and obtained official observer reports
from the European Commission on some of its vessels that fish in the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (“NAFO”) fishery.80 He found that
“on seventy-two days of 2002, EU vessels deliberately targeted several
species for which fishing was banned.”81 Moreover, Spanish and Portuguese
authorities frequently either declined to inspect their own vessels after
reported violations, or performed the inspections and somehow found “no
infringements.”82 Canadian officials, understandably frustrated, can do little
more than continue to report violations, which are not acted on, and publish
an annual compendium of observers’ reports, selectively edited to exclude
“many of the most damaging details” so as to avoid another international
fracas.83 Perhaps it is a measure of the relative strength of the SFSA regime
that ruthless fishing nations must now actually break the law in order to
continue some of their most egregious practices, but such chronic
lawlessness still indicates the ongoing need for more effective enforcement.
Moreover, the (often government-subsidized) overcapacity of the global
fishing fleet exerts constant pressure on regional fishery organizations to
raise catch limits beyond the point of sustainability.84

D. International Plan of Action for the Management of
Fishing Capacity
In 1995, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) issued a
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, an aspirational document that
sought to address the problems of the unsustainable global fishing
industry.85 Along with the Code, the FAO also developed a set of
International Plans of Action to help implement the Code’s most important
principles.86 One of these was the International Plan of Action for the
Management of Fishing Capacity, which calls on states to take “actions such
as monitoring fishing capacity, reducing subsidies that affect capacity,
and . . . retiring vessels from service or even dismantling them when
necessary.”87 Though the Code and the Plans of Action are not binding, they
do at least present a starting place for states willing to address their
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overcapacity problems.
One issue for capacity reduction efforts is that fishing vessels can often
simply relocate, or just re-register, in another State with fewer restrictions.
This move is sometimes known as “flag-hopping,” and the flag of the new,
more permissive state is called a flag of convenience (“FOC”).88 When
Taiwan signed a 1999 capacity-reduction agreement with Japan, for example,
Taiwanese ship owners reflagged their vessels en masse - by the end of 2003,
fifty of the fifty-one operational large Taiwanese long-line tuna vessels were
under FOCs.89 Japan tried to circumvent this problem by requiring that
vessels actually be scrapped, instead of just de-licensed, but this proved
difficult to enforce.90 Reportedly, some of the “scrapped” Japanese vessels
were partially dismantled, shipped to other countries, and then
reassembled, while other vessels had their engines and other parts salvaged
and sold overseas.91 Biologists Daniel Pauly and Jay Maclean recommend
that retired fishing vessels be filled with concrete, as with retired Soviet
tanks, or, fittingly, publicly sunk to the bottom of the sea to become
valuable fish habitat.92

E. Addressing Subsidies to the Fishing Industry Through
the World Trade Organization
Because destructive fishing practices and fleet overcapacity are
enabled by government subsidies, the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”)
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM”) may be one
of the best tools available for fighting overfishing.93 Though it may seem
strange to tackle conservation issues through a trade agreement, the WTO
offers something that most international forums can only dream of - an
effective enforcement mechanism.94 WTO decisions are binding on member
States (which presently include all of the world’s major fishing nations
except Russia), and may be backed up with trade sanctions.95 The U.S. has
been a strong supporter of WTO action on fishing subsidies and has worked
with numerous other member countries (collectively known as “Friends of
Fish”) to put these subsidies on the agenda for the most recent round of
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WTO negotiations.96
The latest negotiating round began in Doha, Qatar, in 2001. In a
promising move, the Doha Declaration assigned the issue of fishing
subsidies to the “Rules” Negotiating Group, which is empowered to
negotiate amendments to the SCM.97 For the first phase of negotiations, the
Friends of Fish countries submitted a paper outlining the problems with
fishing subsidies and the reasons why the SCM was not addressing them
effectively.98 On the other side of the debate were Japan and Korea, who
generally denied that fishing subsidies were harmful to trade or marine
conservation efforts.99 In 2003, the European Community (one of the largest
fishing subsidizers) added momentum to the talks by submitting their own
proposal for measures to limit fishing subsidies.100
Sadly, the Doha negotiations collapsed at the September 2003 meeting
in Cancun, and despite a few sputtering moves forward the Doha agenda
remains stalled as of mid-2010.101 In the meantime, over 100 bilateral and
regional trade deals have been completed since 2001, indicating that
countries may be shifting focus away from the ideologically deadlocked WTO
and towards smaller regional agreements.102 In response, the U.S. appears
to be shifting its fish protection efforts to regional and bilateral forums. In
2006, for example, the U.S. Congress amended the Magnuson-Stevens Act
(discussed in Section VII below), “directing the United States to proceed
bilaterally and multilaterally through various entities, including regional
fishery management organizations (“RFMOs”), to address IUU (illegal,
unreported, and unregulated) fishing, bycatch of PLMRs (protected living
marine resources), and related issues.”103

IV. Habitat Destruction
In the introduction to his 2006 book about the perils of overfishing,
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Charles Clover attempts to describe what bottom trawling might look like if
practiced on land: two huge vehicles with a mile of net stretched between
them, hurtling across the African plain and scooping up all but the smallest
animals, predator and prey alike. A huge iron roller bar attached to the net’s
bottom edge drags along the ground, flushing more animals into the net
and crushing every tree, bush, or outcropping in its path.104 This ludicrous
picture, as Clover points out, is more or less played out “the world over every
day,” except that the vehicles are trawlers and the African plain is the
bottom of the sea.105
Trawling destroys seafloor habitat and disrupts associated ecosystems.
In the open ocean, trawlers strip the coral and sponges from delicate
seamount ecosystems and dredge up sediment clouds that block light and
can choke whatever organisms remain.106 In heavily fished areas like New
England and the Gulf of Mexico, more than half of the vast areas fished by
trawling are exploited more than once a year, allowing “no opportunity for
ecosystem recovery.”107

A. Convention on Biological Diversity
In theory, the Convention on Biological Diversity should apply to
bottom trawling, as its provisions apply both within the parties’ national
jurisdiction and to any “processes and activities” under a party’s “jurisdiction
or control,” “regardless of where their effects occur.”108 Additionally, the
primary principle of the CBD is that states have the right to exploit their own
resources and “the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment . . . of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”109 However, as discussed in
Section II supra, the CBD is a toothless treaty with no binding language and
no compliance mechanism. If a biodiversity convention cannot put a dent in
outright species decimation, there is no chance that it will effectively
address habitat destruction.

B. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 61/105
Beginning in 2003, the UN General Assembly has issued yearly
resolutions on a rather unwieldy topic: “Sustainable fisheries, including
through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments.”110 In 2006, a major
diplomatic effort spearheaded by the tiny island nation of Palau111 managed
to insert twelve new paragraphs into the yearly resolution on “Sustainable
fisheries etc.” (UNGA Resolution 61/105), calling on states to take immediate
action to “protect vulnerable marine ecosystems, including seamounts,
hydrothermal vents and cold water corals, from destructive fishing
practices.”112 This new section commands regional fisheries organizations to
“assess, on the basis of the best available scientific information, whether
individual bottom fishing activities would have significant adverse impacts
on vulnerable marine ecosystems,” and if so, “to prevent such impacts”
through management or an outright ban.113
Unfortunately, UN General Assembly Resolutions are generally held to
be nonbinding “recommendations,” though any country may decide to take
them more seriously as authoritative sources of international law.114 For
example, when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in 1992 calling
for a global moratorium on pelagic driftnet fishing, the United States backed
this resolution with the threat of sanctions against noncomplying
countries.115 The U.S. backing gave teeth to the driftnet resolution, leading
to “significant worldwide reductions in high seas driftnet fishing.”116 Similar
measures can and should be used to deter bottom trawling, especially on
the high seas, where the high costs of deepwater trawling are often not even
sustainable without massive government subsidies.117 On the other hand,
the very existence of such subsidies is evidence of the perverse incentives
and political pressures that will have to be addressed before the global
fishing industry can be effectively controlled.
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V. Pollution
Most oceanic pollution is actually from land-based sources, which may
be divided into point sources (like sewer pipes) and non-point sources (like
agricultural runoff).118 Jeremy Jackson also uses the term broadly to include
the “biological pollution” of foreign species introduced into a new marine
ecosystem.119 In coastal seas and estuaries, land-based chemical pollution
and introduced species have surpassed overfishing as threats to
biodiversity.120

A. The IMO Conventions
The International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) dates back to 1948,
when the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (“IMCO”)
was created to oversee international shipping matters.121 Although the
original IMCO Convention made no mention of environmental concerns,
these were brought to the fore by the 1967 Torrey Canyon oil tanker spill off
the coast of England, which revealed the inadequacies of the international
system for handling oil spills.122 The 1975 amendments to the Convention
created a Marine Environment Protection Committee within the
organization, and added to the Convention’s purposes “the prevention and
control of marine pollution from ships.”123 Since the Torrey Canyon spill, the
IMO (now a specialized agency of the UN) has drafted and adopted a
number of conventions dealing with environmental issues, including waste
dumping, biological contamination from ships’ ballast water, and oil spills.
Deliberate dumping of matter into the ocean accounts for less than
10% of oceanic pollution, but it tends to be concentrated in the ecologically
rich areas near coasts.124 In 1972, the IMO’s Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, also known as
the London Convention, “placed a formidable international legal firewall
between clean seas and irresponsible dumping practices.”125 Though the
London Convention does not prohibit all deliberate ocean dumping, it does

118.
David Freestone, A Decade of the Law of the Sea Convention: Is It a Success? 39
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 499, 502 (2007).
119.
Jackson, supra note 1, at 11459.
120.
Id.
121.
International Maritime Organization (IMO), Convention on the
International Maritime Organization, available at www.imo.org (select “Legal” tab, then
select “IMO Conventions”).
122.
Id.
123.
Id. The 1975 amendments also rechristened the organization as the IMO.
124.
See Alan Sielen, The New International Rules on Ocean Dumping: Promise and
Performance, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 297 (2009).
125.
Id.
209

West

Northwest, Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 2011

prohibit dumping of certain materials and require a permit for others.126 In
1996, an ambitious new Protocol to the Convention updated the original
agenda with modern environmental concepts like the precautionary
approach, the “polluter pays” principle, and the need to ensure that
pollution control efforts in one area do not simply relocate the pollution to
another area.127
In 2004, the International Convention for the Control and Management
of Ship’s Ballast Water and Sediments, also known as the Ballast Water
Convention, was created to address “the threat posed by aquatic organisms
and pathogens contained in ballast water.”128 When commercial ships are
not carrying a heavy cargo load, they usually take on water, known as ballast
water, to increase their stability.129 When a ship reaches port and prepares
to take on cargo, it will discharge the ballast water, along with any number
of foreign species, from bacteria and viruses to small fish.130 A study of cargo
ships arriving in Oregon found over 360 different foreign species in the
vessels’ ballast water.131 Once an invasive species establishes itself in a new
ecosystem, it may feed on or infect native species, or compete with them for
food and space.132 The jellyfish infesting the Black and Caspian Seas,
mentioned in Section I, is the North American Comb Jelly, an American
invasive species whose voracious appetite for zooplankton likely contributed
to the collapse of Black Sea fisheries.133 But invasive species go both ways Caspian Sea zebra mussels, now firmly established in the U.S. Great Lakes,
have degraded ecosystems, clogged drainage pipes, and caused billions of
dollars’ worth of damage.134
The IMO’s direct response to the 1967 Torrey Canyon oil spill was the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
commonly known as MARPOL.135 MARPOL addresses nearly every type of
non-biological pollution from ships, including oil, sewage, garbage, and air
pollution.136 Unfortunately, like the other IMO conventions, MARPOL is
restricted to pollution from ships, and thus fails to cover the majority of
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marine pollution, which originates on land. Even in the realm of ship-based
pollution, MARPOL has not been particularly effective, largely due to its
reliance on port States to enforce its regulations.137

B. UNCLOS and the IMO
Despite its considerable size, UNCLOS is still in many ways a
framework convention, in that it depends on organizations like the IMO to
develop more specific conventions in order to implement its goals.138 When
UNCLOS directs that States must enforce “generally accepted international
standards,” these include the agreements developed by the IMO.139
Unfortunately, the fairly comprehensive UNCLOS/IMO prescriptive regime is
not matched by an especially effective enforcement regime. As with
overfishing, most vessel pollution control measures under UNCLOS are
meant to be enforced primarily by a vessel’s flag State (State of registration),
allowing shady vessel owners to opt for sailing under a flag of convenience
instead of complying with the law.140
The “flag State problem” has not gone unnoticed by the international
community. The UN General Assembly issues yearly resolutions calling on
flag States to ensure compliance of their vessels with international laws or
stop registering vessels altogether.141 Many countries have beefed up
foreign vessel inspections within their own ports or territories, a measure
known as “Port State Control.”142 Port States, however, can do little to
enforce pollution controls for ships on the high seas, and lax enforcement
by some flag States continues to pose a problem for the international legal
community.143
Unlike the IMO conventions, which are centered on ships, UNCLOS
attempts to cover all marine issues, including land-based pollution.
Unfortunately, the UNCLOS provisions requiring parties to “prevent, reduce
and control” land-based pollution sources have proven to be largely
ineffective.144 Again, enforcement is a problem - it is all but impossible to
determine which state is responsible for pollution discovered in another
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state’s waters.145

C. Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the
Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities
In an effort to better address the problem of land-based pollution, the
U.N. Environment Programme (“UNEP”) held a summit in 1995 which
resulted in the “Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-Based Activities” (“GPA”).146 Though the GPA itself
has no legal force, it serves as a template for States wishing to create their
own binding rules.147 Thus far, regional bodies have been more successful
than states in implementing the GPA, possibly due to the greater perceived
benefit of regional cooperative agreements.148 The Mediterranean states, for
example, revised the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean
Sea Against Pollution (the Barcelona Convention, originally adopted in
1976) to incorporate elements of the GPA.149 However, the revisions
pertaining to land-based pollution sources have yet to enter into force, as
their requirements are too strict for some of the parties.150

VI. Climate Change
Climate change has two primary effects on the ocean: acidification and
surface warming. Acidification is directly caused by the increase in carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere, as some of the carbon is absorbed by the
seawater to form carbonic acid.151 Because of this process, the ocean is
often referred to as a “carbon sink,” meaning that it plays an important role
in regulating atmospheric carbon dioxide.152 Unfortunately, even a mild
increase in acidity inhibits the ability of calcareous marine organisms to
grow and form their shells or exoskeletons, which in turn disrupts the
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oceanic carbon cycle and slows or stops the formation of coral reefs.153
Corals are also vulnerable to rising water temperatures, the other
major effect of climate change on the oceans. Warming has already begun
to cause coral death, known as “bleaching,” a process that has accelerated
during the last twenty or thirty years.154 Warmer surface water also keeps
cooler, nutrient-rich subsurface water from circulating to the surface, leading
to thermal stratification of the water column and lower biological
productivity.155 This, in turn, lowers fish numbers, and in poorly managed
fisheries may lead to a crash,156 as seen in the El Niño-induced crash of the
Peruvian anchoveta fishery mentioned in Section III, supra. The World Bank
predicts that, as climate change leads to increased climatic variability,
cyclical patterns like the El Niño/La Niña events will become more extreme,
with future moderate El Niño events showing effects similar to a strong El
Niño event today, and future strong El Niño events having unknown, but
possibly disastrous, consequences.157
International law regulating climate change is founded on the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), another
convention to emerge from the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio.158 The UNFCCC is
currently being implemented under the Kyoto Protocol, adopted at the third
Conference of the Parties (“COP3”) in 1997 and entered into force in 2005.159
In December 2009, the 15th COP met in Copenhagen to try to work out a new
protocol, a meeting that Time magazine labeled “perhaps the most important
environmental summit in the history of the world.”160 The results, as readers
may recall, were extremely disappointing.

A. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change
While certainly an essential first step on the path to a global carbonemissions regime, the UNFCCC itself contains only the most general goals
and provisions. The Convention’s objective is the “[s]tabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
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prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,” but
what that level might be, or what measures must be taken in order to reach
it, are not specified.161 The UNFCCC did not even require any cuts in
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, though it did “urge” the developed
countries (known as “Annex I” countries) to cut their emissions back down to
1990 levels.162 At COP1, the UNFCCC Parties agreed that stronger action was
necessary, and work began on what would become the Kyoto Protocol.163

B. The Kyoto Protocol
By the 1997 COP3 meeting in Kyoto, the Parties were ready and willing
to set binding emissions targets. The Kyoto Protocol does just that,
mandating that Annex I Parties reduce their total GHG emissions by 5%
below 1990 levels for the 2008-12 “commitment period.”164 The Protocol also
lists specific reduction commitments for each Annex I Party165 and provides
for a “Clean Development Mechanism,” by which Annex I Parties can fund
emissions reduction projects in developing countries and use any certified
reductions toward their own reduction targets.166
Despite its obvious improvements on the UNFCCC framework, the
Kyoto Protocol has many serious flaws. As with the CBD, the wealthier
countries were forced to make substantial concessions to developing
countries - most significantly, a complete lack of emissions targets. This is
especially problematic because the list of developing countries (non-Annex I
Parties) includes China, the world’s number one emitter of GHGs, as well as
India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Iran, and South Africa - all among the top
twenty biggest emitters as of 2005.167 The Protocol also declined to provide
any compliance mechanism, and mandated that any such “procedures and
mechanisms . . . entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by means
of an amendment to this Protocol.”168 Since an amendment to the Protocol
is only binding on the countries that accept the amendment,169 this
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effectively allows any party to simply decline any consequences for noncompliance.
Thus far, the U.S. has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. While the
Clinton Administration expressed support for binding targets, the Senate
passed a unanimous resolution before the Kyoto summit declaring that the
U.S. would not ratify any binding agreement that exempted the developing
countries.170
As the U.S. is the world’s second-largest emitter of
anthropogenic GHGs (only recently surpassed by China),171 our absence is
particularly damaging to the Protocol’s effectiveness. Under the Protocol,
the U.S. would have been committed to an emissions reduction of 7% below
1990 levels during the commitment period of 2008-12.172 Instead, according
to the latest report we submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat, our emissions
were 16.8% higher than 1990 levels by 2007.173
Then again, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has not been a very good
predictor of emissions reductions for other developed countries. While total
emissions for all Annex I countries were down 3.9% from 1990 levels by 2007
(5.2% with land-use changes included), this seems to be mostly a result of
the inclusion of the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries (known as “EIT
Parties,” for Economies in Transition), whose emissions were down a
whopping 37% in 2007 (42.2% with land-use changes).174 This is hardly
surprising, given the general economic downturn in these countries
following the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. For Annex I
non-EIT Parties, total emissions actually went up - 11.2% over 1990 levels in
2007, and 12.8% with land-use changes.175 Thus, it appears that many parties
with healthy economies have been less than inspired to meet even their
modest reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. In fact,
numerous Annex I Parties have increased their emissions even more than
the U.S., including Turkey, Australia, Spain, and Canada.176

C. COP15 and the Future of the Global Climate Change
Regime
With stronger climate science and increased public awareness,
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expectations were high for the 2009 15th Conference of the UNFCCC Parties
in Copenhagen.
As the Conference wore on, however, it become
increasingly obvious that a consensus would not be forthcoming. The
Conference’s final product, known as the Copenhagen Accord, is a
nonbinding agreement with no individual emissions targets for Annex I
countries and no real direction for developing countries, either.177 And yet,
even this skeletal document does not represent any real agreement - the
Conference finally decided to merely “take note” of the Accord, meaning that
none of the Parties actually committed to anything at all.178
In taking stock of COP15’s failure to create an effective climate regime
in Copenhagen, it may be helpful to look briefly at a global environmental
regime that has actually worked. The best example of such a regime is the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal
Protocol), hailed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as “[p]erhaps
the single most successful international agreement to date.”179 In Montreal,
the concerns of developing countries were dealt with by allowing for a tenyear grace period, during which developing countries were allowed to
continue production of ozone-depleting substances, followed by a 50%
reduction requirement for the next ten years.180 A “comprehensive funding
mechanism” was created in 1992, providing a clear incentive for developing
countries to become Parties.181 Broad participation in turn encouraged the
developed countries to commit to stricter targets, knowing that their own
sacrifices would not simply be offset by increased production of the
controlled substances by non-Parties.182 Moreover, once a country became a
Party, it was strongly motivated to actually comply with its targets because
the Montreal Protocol features an effective compliance mechanism,
including both “hard” sanctions like trade restriction and “soft” measures
like technical assistance and reporting requirements.183
At the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen, the one lesson the UNFCCC
Parties seemed to have learned from Montreal was that funding encourages
participation. The developed countries pledged $30 billion per year to a new
Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, with a goal of increasing to $100 billion
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per year in 2020.184 However, the details - like where the money will come
from and how it will be used - have yet to be settled,185 leaving the UNFCCC
Parties far short of a “comprehensive funding mechanism.” Meanwhile, an
effective compliance mechanism does not even seem to be on the
discussion table, and global warming continues apace, with potentially
catastrophic consequences for the world’s oceans.
All things considered, it appears unlikely that international law will be
able to save vulnerable marine ecosystems from disaster. The troubles
plaguing our oceans - overfishing, habitat destruction, pollution, and
climate change - are all collective action problems to some degree, and the
international community does not have the strength or cohesiveness to
handle such problems effectively. While there have been successes in the
past, like the Montreal Protocol and the WTO, these may in fact represent
the high-water mark of global cooperation. The international community
appears to be slowly retreating from the “globalization” mindset, as the WTO
loses ground to regional trading blocs and the unified response of Montreal
gives way to the nationalist bickering of Copenhagen. With this in mind, the
next section turns to a national-level examination of a single fishery - the
massive Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (“BSAI”) fishery off the coast of
Alaska - to see if national laws can at least protect an extremely lucrative
marine ecosystem within a nation’s jurisdiction.

VII.National Laws: The Case of U.S. Law and the Alaskan
Fishery
In 2003, the Pew Oceans Commission reported that “[t]he legal
framework that governs [U.S.] oceans is more than thirty years old, and has
not been updated to reflect the current state of ocean resources or our
values toward them.”186 The Commission identified three overarching
problems with American oceans governance: a focus on exploitation over
environmental integrity, a fragmented legal and institutional regime, and a
management system aimed at individual species instead of whole
ecosystems.187 Sadly, this diagnosis remains as valid today as in 2003,
although as fisheries managers become more scientifically sophisticated,
momentum may be building towards a more integrated and effective
system.
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In order to better understand the interactions between law and marine
biodiversity in the U.S., it will be helpful to focus on a single region and its
commercial fishery. Alaska is an obvious choice, as the waters off Alaska’s
northwest coast contain the largest fishery in the U.S. in terms of both
harvest and area.188 This fishery is known as the Bering Sea and Aleutian
Islands Management Area (BSAIMA, or more commonly, just BSAI), and
pollock is its star product.189 The expected pollock catch for 2010 is 813,000
metric tons, or “about 40 percent of the world’s total whitefish catch.”190 The
pollock fishery adopted a modern “catch shares” system in 1999,191 and was
subsequently certified as sustainable by the Marine Stewardship Council
(“MSC”), whose assessors described the fishery, after over two years of study,
as “world-class.”192 However, pollock numbers have fallen in the past couple
of years and endangered Steller sea lion populations have failed to recover,
prompting Greenpeace to declare that “the pollock fishery is on the fasttrack to collapse.”193

A. Biodiversity
The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)194 is the primary federal law
designed to safeguard American biodiversity. Enacted by Congress in 1973,
the ESA offers protection for plant and animal species listed as
“endangered” or “threatened,” including protection for the species’ “critical
habitat.”195 Under the ESA, a federal agency may not take any action deemed
“likely to jeopardize” a threatened or endangered species or its habitat.196
The ESA maintains a complicated relationship with other federal laws
and policies, as illustrated in Alaska by the case of the Steller sea lion.
Steller sea lions are found throughout the northern Pacific Rim, including
the Aleutian Islands and the Gulf of Alaska.197 Steller numbers plummeted
in the 1980s, and the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) listed the
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Steller as “threatened” under the ESA in 1990.198 Under the Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (later known, after amendment,
as the Magnuson-Stevens Act), NMFS is responsible for developing and
adopting fishery management plans in concert with regional fishery
management councils.199 And, as the agency that listed the Steller sea lion
under the ESA, NMFS is also responsible for making sure that federal
actions “are not likely to jeopardize” the Steller sea lion “or adversely modify
its critical habitat.”200 Thus, before approving the fishery management plan
of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (“NPFMC,” the managing
body of the Alaskan fishery), NMFS was forced to officially consult with itself
on whether its approval of the proposed plan (a federal action) was likely to
harm the Stellers.201 This assessment was complicated by the fact that, after
years of extensive studies, no one was yet able to say for certain what was
causing the Stellers’ decline.202
Each time NMFS is called to approve a new NPFMC management plan,
it must perform its self-consultation and issue a Biological Opinion
(“BiOp”), addressing the effect of the proposed NPFMC fishery on the Steller
sea lion.203 In 1992, after the first BiOp found that the fishery posed “no
jeopardy” to the Stellers, a coalition of environmental groups led by
Greenpeace challenged NMFS in court, asserting that Alaska’s growing trawl
fishery threatened the Steller sea lion and other declining species, including
seals and marine birds that depend on the fish.204 The courts backed NMFS,
deferring to agency expertise.205 The agency, however, was now under
pressure, and a new BiOp in 1998 found that “the proposed pollock fishery
would likely jeopardize the western Steller sea lion population and adversely
modify its critical habitat, but that the Atka mackerel fishery would not.”206
The BiOp was immediately attacked from both sides - by environmental
groups, who challenged the finding of “no jeopardy” for the mackerel fishery,
and by the fishing industry, who challenged the jeopardy finding for the
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pollock fishery.207
Years of litigation followed, in which an increasingly vulnerable NMFS
found its every decision challenged and scrutinized.208 At the behest of
Alaskan Senator Ted Stevens, the federal government poured over $120
million into Steller sea lion research over four years - an amount that
“dwarfs the funding for research on other endangered marine animals” - and
still failed to come to any definite conclusions.209 But the ESA does not
require scientific certainty; it merely directs agencies to act on the “best
scientific and commercial data available.”210 In theory, NMFS need only
estimate the amount of risk the fishery presents to the Stellar sea lions, and
whether that risk is above acceptable levels. In reality, the ESA does not
specify what level of risk is acceptable,211 and science can provide only a
vague sketch of the relationship between the Steller sea lions and the
fishery. With very little guidance from science or the law, NMFS is supposed
to strike the perfect balance between the interests of a billion-dollar
industry and a mysterious and struggling sea mammal, under the litigious
gaze of advocates for both sides. In this technically and politically difficult
situation, it is not surprising that NMFS would want to “seek shelter in
scientific certainty,” but such certainty is not forthcoming on complex
ecosystem issues, and probably never will be.212

B. Overfishing
In the U.S., fishery management first got off the ground in 1976, with
the passage of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act.213
The Magnuson Act laid out seven standards for federal management of
fisheries and set up eight regional fishery management councils (overseen
by NMFS) to handle the actual regulating.214 For the next twenty years, the

207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id. at 172, 182-86.
Rex Dalton, Is This Any Way to Save a Species? 436 NATURE, July 7, 2005, at 14-

15.
210.
McBeath, supra note 199, at 41, quoting Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(2) (2002).
211.
Bryant, supra note 197, at 195-96 (noting that “[t]he jeopardy standard is
intended ‘to give the benefit of the doubt to the species,’” but that “agencies now
have discretion to allow some unspecified amount of risk, as long as there is ‘a finger
on the scale, of some indeterminate size, on the side of the species’”) (citations
omitted).
212.
Id. at 199.
213.
Roger Fleming & John D. Crawford, Symposium: Special Strategies for Protecting
Special Areas: Habitat Protection Under The Magnuson-Stevens Act: Can It Really Contribute to
Ecosystem Health in the Northwest Atlantic? 12 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 43, 47 (2006).
214.
Id.
220

West

Northwest, Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 2011

management councils generally neglected to prevent overfishing or
effectively rebuild fish stocks, focusing instead on the demands of the
industry for more fishing opportunities.215 Amendments to the Act in 1996
and 2006 emphasized the need for conservation and “economically rational
exploitation of fish stocks”; these have had mixed results.216
Depending on whom you ask, the regional fishery management
councils are either “industry-dominated”217 or a collection of “local
stakeholders and experts familiar with unique fishery circumstances.”218 The
devolution of fishery management to these regional councils may be
considered the “centerpiece” of the Magnuson Act system.219 Under the Act,
the councils have primary responsibility for crafting Fishery Management
Plans (“FMPs”) for each fish species in their jurisdiction that requires
managing, as well as proposing regulations to implement the FMPs.220 The
councils’ work must be reviewed and adopted by NMFS, acting for the U.S.
Secretary of Commerce, but this review is supposedly limited to “ensuring
that each FMP, FMP amendment, and proposed regulation is consistent with
the [Magnuson Act] and other applicable laws.”221
In fact, NMFS’s executive authority is bedeviled by unclear legislative
standards on the one hand, and wildly varying amounts of judicial deference
on the other. Many of the applicable laws (like the ESA, discussed above)
allow federal agencies a great deal of discretion, leaving NMFS torn between
federal conservation concerns and locally based economic demands, which
may manifest themselves in the form of powerful and unpredictable U.S.
Senators (see Section VIIC below). However, the precise amount of
discretion that an agency like NMFS can expect “has been understood to
vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the
agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the
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persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”222
The sad irony of power struggles over American fisheries management
is that almost all parties want the same basic thing: sustainable, productive
fisheries. Unfortunately, traditional fisheries management tends to create
predictable “tragedy of the commons” outcomes.223 Managers set a yearly
“total allowable catch” (“TAC”), and fishermen then race to catch as much as
possible for themselves before this limit is reached.224 In the process, fishing
effort becomes concentrated into a short temporal window, while the
overcapacity built up to compete with other fishermen provides a strong
incentive to push the TAC to the highest possible limit, and then a little
higher.225 While the Magnuson Act originally dictated that the allowable
catch should “not exceed maximum sustainable yield except in special
circumstances,” the exception for special circumstances was so flagrantly
abused that Congress was forced to remove it in the 1996 Sustainable
Fisheries Act.226
In 1998, Congress moved to address the problem of destructive
competition in the BSAI pollock fishery by passing the American Fisheries
Act (“AFA”), which introduced a cooperative quota system to the fishery.227
The Alaskan pollock, halibut, and black sablefish fisheries are all currently
managed under this type of system, in which individual fishing enterprises
are given allowances of a fixed portion of the yearly TAC.228 This more or less
eliminates the problematic incentive to create overcapacity, because the
fixed individual quotas cannot be increased with more or bigger boats.229
The evolution of the quota system in Alaska is a huge development, as the
pollock fishery alone is “the largest remaining stock of palatable fish in the
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world,”230 supplying a steady flow of whitefish for Gorton’s frozen fish fillets
and McDonald’s Filet-O-Fish sandwiches.231 Under the quota system,
Alaskan pollock fishermen claim to have shifted their focus from catching as
many fish as possible to catching the right size of fish with the least
bycatch.232 In fact, according to the Marine Stewardship Council, the pollock
fishery boasts a bycatch rate of less than 1%.233 For comparison, the global
bycatch rate is estimated at 10% to 20%, and well over 50% for some
fisheries such as Gulf of Mexico shrimp.234 The NPFMC recently amended its
FMP to allocate more of the cod catch to the AFA (pollock) fleet, a move
“motivated by the fact that the AFA trawl [catcher/processor] sector was
efficient in its Pacific cod fishing, with a higher percentage of its allocation
being used up by directed fishing”235 - that is, the pollock fleet also has an
extremely low bycatch rate when catching cod.
In 2008, the biomass of the U.S. pollock fishery fell from 1.8 million
tons to 940,000 tons, causing Greenpeace to declare “the world’s largest
food fishery on the brink of collapse,” the tragic result of overfishing and
mismanagement.236 But the relationship between fishing and fish biomass
is not nearly as simple as Greenpeace makes it out to be. Fish populations
vary from year to year, and exploited stocks vary more widely than
unexploited stocks.237 This phenomenon, long noted by ecologists, was
recently explained by a team of scientists using the fifty-year data set from
the California Cooperative Oceanic Fisheries Investigations.238 The scientists
found that, contrary to what one might expect, variations in fishing intensity
did little to explain the variability observed in harvested populations.239
Rather, by selectively removing the larger individuals, fishing pushes a
population’s age structure towards the younger, smaller end of the
spectrum.240 This is known as juvenescence or “age truncation effect,” and as
MSY advocates have long claimed, it does appear to boost a population’s
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growth rate.241 Unfortunately, a higher growth rate leads to increased
nonlinear, unstable population dynamics, including lows of less than onetenth the average population size.242
These findings would seem to indicate that environmental groups
should pause before crying “Collapse!” at the first sign of a low-biomass
year. On the other hand, the problem of nonlinearity indicates that yearly
fishing quotas should be approached with even more precaution than
previously thought, because it is difficult to anticipate the yearly population
fluctuations of an exploited stock. Furthermore, age truncation can act as an
evolutionary selective process, causing the increased variability of exploited
stocks to become long-term or permanent.243 Thus, even when a fish stock
has “recovered” in terms of numbers, it may still retain a shifted age
distribution and concomitant high variability.244 On a positive note, the
authors of the variability study noted that age shifts in Alaskan fisheries
have been “relatively minor” compared with other U.S. fisheries, and
credited Alaska’s superior fishery management.245 This is good news for
pollock, which already has naturally high population fluctuations.246

C. Habitat Destruction
Healthy habitat is essential for marine species, especially groundfish
like cod and halibut, whose juveniles use the sea bed for resting and evading
predators.247 Although the NPFMC has banned habitat-destroying trawling
practices in parts of the Alaskan fishery dominated by non-trawlers or crab
fishermen, the Council has so far been unwilling to do so in other areas
unless the potential benefits can be “expressed in direct economic terms.”248
In 1996, Congress passed the Sustainable Fisheries Act, amending the
Magnuson Act to include, among other conservation issues, the protection
of fish habitat.249 The fishery management councils and NMFS were directed
to “describe and identify essential fish habitat” in their fishery management
plans and to “minimize to the extent practicable adverse effects on such
habitat caused by fishing.”250 Congress defined “essential fish habitat” very
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broadly as “those waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning,
breeding, feeding or growth to maturity,” with “fish” defined as virtually all
marine species aside from mammals and birds.251
In response to this clear directive, NMFS and the NPFMC dragged their
feet, preferring to focus on designation of essential fish habitat while
postponing the politically difficult task of assessing and minimizing the
habitat effects of the Alaskan fishery.252 Environmental groups sued, and
NMFS finally started to get moving, publishing a draft environmental impact
statement on possible fish habitat strategies in 2004 (six years after the
agency was supposed to have complied fully with the Sustainable Fisheries
Act).253 However, just as NMFS was beginning to change course, Senator Ted
Stevens intervened, adding a rider to a 2004 Congressional spending bill
that prevented any money from being spent on implementing fish habitat
protection in the North Pacific.254 The NPFMC announced that its favored
fish habitat protection strategy would be maintaining the status quo, and
Senator Stevens dropped the rider, pronouncing himself “satisfied with the
direction the agency was taking, allowing bottom trawling and other fishing
to continue as is.”255 Ironically, Senator Stevens was one of the original
champions of the Sustainable Fisheries Act,256 which he then gutted with his
financial strong-arm tactics. Congress had changed the “Magnuson Act” to
the “Magnuson-Stevens Act” in his honor.257

D. Pollution
In 2008, the EPA released its third comprehensive assessment of the
health of U.S. coastal waters, entitled National Coastal Condition Report III
(“NCCR III”).258 Overall, the report concluded, our coastal waters are in “fair”
shape, with slight improvement from the early 1990s but no real
improvement since the second report, which assessed data from the late
1990s.259 Alaska, however, included for the first time in NCCR III, proved to
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be a golden exception, with perfect scores in the three ecological indicators
measured: water quality, sediment quality, and fish tissue contaminants.260
The report noted that Alaska’s largely inaccessible coasts, low population
density, and lack of agriculture all helped to keep its coastline “in pristine or
near-pristine condition.”261
While certainly good news for Alaska, the report also raises some red
flags about possible future developments. First, the food web does contain
contaminants like mercury and persistent organic pollutants (“POPs”),
thought to come primarily from more polluted areas outside of the state.262
Alaska’s location and environment may make it a “sink” for mercury and
POPs carried by ocean and wind currents from around the Pacific Rim - a
problem likely to worsen with rapid development of Pacific Rim countries.263
Second, Alaska itself continues to develop, with Alaskan coastal populations
growing by 63% in the period 1980-2003 (the highest growth rate of any U.S.
coastal region).264 Third, as global climate change continues to melt the
Arctic sea ice, shipping and other activities in the area are likely to increase,
with unknown implications for local water quality.265
A number of federal laws govern marine pollution in the U.S., including
the Ocean Dumping Act, which regulates the dumping of potentially harmful
materials into U.S. oceans,266 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
also known as the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), which regulates the overall
water quality of “the Nation’s waters.”267 However, as the Pew Oceans
Commission pointed out, our plethora of marine and coastal laws create an
uncoordinated patchwork that fails to provide adequate protection for our
oceans.268 For example, when the Exxon Valdez oil tanker captured the
nation’s attention by running aground in Alaska in 1989, Congress passed
the Oil Pollution Act to better manage future oil spills.269 According to the
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National Research Council, however, the amount of oil spilled by the Exxon
Valdez washes off of our streets and parking lots and into our oceans every
eight months.270 The CWA, despite its partial success in regulating pollution
point sources, has done little to control the non-point runoff of oil,
fertilizers, and other substances that now poses “the greatest pollution
threat to our oceans and coasts.”271 And of course, the Oil Pollution Act did
not prevent the Deepwater Horizon fiasco, which is continuing to foul the Gulf
of Mexico as of this writing and has already surpassed the Exxon Valdez as the
largest U.S. oil spill ever.272 Predictably, the Congressional response to the
Deepwater Horizon situation has largely consisted of desultory attempts to
repeal liability limitations.273
In addition to the usual marginally effective marine pollution laws,
Congress has also crafted several pieces of legislation that specifically
address the “biological pollution” caused by aquatic invasive species,
including the Lacey Act,274 the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention
and Control Act (“NANPCA”),275 and the National Invasive Species Act
(NISA).276 The Lacey Act has minimal effect, as it deals only with
importation of a small number of listed “injurious” species.277 The NANPCA
was primarily directed at the Great Lakes’ infestation of zebra mussels, and
instructed the U.S. Coast Guard to create a system of voluntary ballast water
regulations for the region.278 These regulations were later made mandatory,
as were the Coast Guard’s nationwide ballast regulations promulgated
under the NISA.279 Under the Coast Guard regulations, all ballast-carrying
ships in U.S. waters must have a Ballast Water Management Plan, and must
take basic precautionary measures like cleaning anchors, chains, and tanks,
and avoiding ballast discharge in protected or coastal areas.280
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Alaska has its own laws limiting the importation of live fish, oysters,
and scallops, though these laws are limited and do not address other
potentially invasive species.281 Thus far, aquatic nuisance species have not
been a serious problem for Alaska, possibly due to its cold climate and
relatively healthy ecosystems (as compared with other U.S. coastal states).282
However, this may change as the northern latitudes begin to feel the
increasing effects of global warming. Notably, a future ice-free Northwest
Passage could route a great deal of shipping through Alaskan waters, with
plenty of opportunity for invasive organisms to hitch a ride on ships’ hulls
and in ballast tanks.283 Also, climate shifts may affect the ability of invasive
species to survive or reproduce, while conversely, invasive species and other
types of marine pollution can lower the resilience of marine ecosystems,
making them less able to adapt to abrupt climatic changes.284

E. Climate Change
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court held that greenhouse gases could be
covered by the Clean Air Act.285 Under the Court’s ruling, the EPA
Administrator would have to make an official determination on whether
GHG emissions from new cars pose a danger to “public health or welfare,”
and if the answer was yes, the EPA would have to regulate them.286 The EPA
released its report in December 2009, finding that current and projected
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs “threaten the public health and welfare
of current and future generations.”287 The finding is a prerequisite for “the
first-ever federal greenhouse-gas regulations for both cars and industrial
sources such as power plants.”288 The EPA decision was challenged in the
Senate by a coalition of industrial-state Democrats and Republicans, led by
Alaskan Senator Lisa Murkowski, but the “disapproval resolution” was
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narrowly defeated.289
In March 2010, the EPA also agreed to address the ocean acidifying
effects of climate change under the Clean Water Act.290 Under the
agreement, which forms part of a lawsuit settlement, the EPA is currently
accepting public comment on how states might monitor and regulate ocean
acidity.291 Strong EPA action should be good news for Alaska (despite the
objections of Sen. Murkowski), where acid levels in the Gulf of Alaska and
Bering Sea “are increasing more quickly and more severely than previously
thought.”292
Alongside the EPA regulatory developments, the U.S. Congress has
been moving on a parallel track towards a comprehensive cap-and-trade
regime for GHG emissions. However, with legislative momentum stalled in
the Senate, cap-and-trade advocates are now considering starting with a
limited bill that would only cover electrical utilities.293 American utility
companies already have experience with cap-and-trade under the Clean Air
Act’s acid rain program, which met sulfur dioxide reduction targets “at
approximately half the cost of traditional regulation.”294 Notably, it is the
industries left out of the limited Congressional bill that are worried, as they
will be subject to the forthcoming (and costly) EPA regulations, which the
covered utilities would probably be exempted from.295
Of course, even if the U.S. were to slash its GHG emissions tomorrow,
this alone would not solve the problem of climate change in Alaskan waters.
The genuinely global nature of the problem makes it impossible for any
nation to deal with unilaterally, while the localized nature of climate change
effects makes it difficult to predict what will happen in any given ecosystem.
Alaska’s northern latitude has tended to amplify warming effects in recent
years, with retreating glaciers, widespread forest fires, and melting
permafrost already causing trouble throughout the state.296 Then again, if
the changes become severe enough to disrupt ocean currents, Arctic and
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sub-Arctic regions could actually experience a cooling effect.297 Perhaps due
to this extreme unpredictability, recent research on climate change and
Alaskan fisheries seems to be focusing on adaptive management
strategies.298
Meanwhile, the NPFMC has recently begun to consider and account for
climate change in its fishery management plans.299 In response to warming
trends in the Arctic Ocean, the Council adopted the first FMP for the Arctic
Management Area, banning all commercial fishing there until sufficient data
can be collected on which to base sound management decisions.300 In 2007,
the Council also published a Fishery Ecosystem Plan (“FEP”) for the Aleutian
Islands.301 The FEP is the result of a pilot project to create “an overarching
document, which provides an ecological context for fishery management
decisions affecting the Aleutian Islands area.”302 This innovative program
will allow the Council to consider the fishery at an ecosystem level and
study the local interactions between system-wide factors like fishing and
climate change.
Unfortunately, there is only so much the Council can do about climate
change. Continuing acidification in Alaskan waters could prove deadly to all
shell-forming sea creatures, from king crab to tiny pteropods, the planktonic
mollusks that comprise fully half of an Alaska pink salmon’s diet.303 And the
effects of acidity are not confined to shellfish and their predators. A recent
study found that pollock respond to oceanic acidity by increasing their
blood levels of bicarbonate, which acts as an acid buffer.304 Further research
is needed to determine whether the pollock are getting the bicarbonate from
seawater or from dissolving their own bones.305

VIII. Conclusion
Jeremy Jackson concludes his 2008 survey of oceanic peril with a few
recommendations for immediate action to address the greatest threats to
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marine ecosystems worldwide.306 The first, and probably the easiest, is
sustainable fishery management. As the overall success of the Alaskan
fishery demonstrates, rational, science-based fishery management is both
possible and politically viable. Under the UNCLOS Straddling Fish Stocks
Agreement, global fishery management is gradually shifting towards
regional bodies, in which all parties with an economic interest in the fishery
can cooperate to preserve the common resource. Hopefully, as this system
strengthens, international fisheries will follow the Alaskan fishery’s progress
in the direction of adaptive and ecosystem-based management.
Jackson’s second, and more difficult, recommendation is to shift our
agricultural practices away from the “[h]eavily subsidized overuse of
chemical fertilizers and pesticides, poor soil management practices, and
unregulated animal production systems” that lead to polluted runoff in our
coastal waters.307
As demonstrated by the slow uptake of UNEP’s
“Programme of Action” for land-based marine pollution, even regional
bodies may have a difficult time mustering the political will to effectively
address this issue. Unlike fisheries, in which the actors using the resource
are also those affected by it, the agricultural actors causing marine pollution
are likely to be far removed, both geographically and economically, from the
downstream results of their actions. The apparent failure of the WTO’s Doha
Round showed that the developed world’s agricultural sector has
tremendous political power - enough to squash even the economically
rational subsidy cuts desired by the developing countries,308 and probably
more than enough to override the interests of marine conservationists and
coastal communities. It is hard to imagine a regional governing body that
could reconcile the interests of, say, native Alaskans who subsist on
mercury-contaminated salmon and the industrial and agricultural interests
as far away as Asia who are the source of such pollutants.
Jackson’s final recommendation, and almost certainly the most
difficult of all, is to confront the threat of climate change by shifting our
economy away from fossil fuels.309 If marine pollution poses a more
complicated problem than fishery management because of the geographic
and economic separation of causes and effects, then climate change
presents the most complex and globalized problem imaginable. Jackson
readily acknowledges that climate change and its effects “comprise the
greatest challenge to humanity today,” one whose solution “will require all
of the ingenuity humanity can muster and will preoccupy us for the
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remainder of the century.”310 But he also points out that localized action to
protect marine ecosystems remains relevant, because healthy ecosystems
are more resilient and better able to adapt to the coming changes. The
North Pacific Fishery Management Council may not be able to do much to
prevent climate change, but it can study and gain understanding of the
effects of climate change on Alaskan marine ecosystems, and adjust its
fishery management accordingly. As Jackson points out, such local
measures may be able to “buy time” for ecosystems until the global
community figures out how to bring its GHG emissions under control.311
Hopefully, studying the interactions between local ecosystems and climate
change will also provide momentum for a global solution to the problem by
showing us just how much we have to lose, and just how close we really are
to losing it.
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